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THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
ANNUAL BEN FERENCZ PANEL

This panel was convened at 10:45 am, Thursday, April IO, by its moderator, David Kaye
of the University of California-Irvine, who introduced the panelists: Hans-Peter Kaul of the
International Criminal Court; Milena Sterio of Cleveland State University; Jane Stromseth
of the Office of Global Criminal Justice, U.S. State Department; and Dire Tladi of the
University of Pretoria and Institute for Security Studies.*
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW IN 2013:
THE MOST SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS

By Milena Sterio t
INTRODUCTION

While many events have shaped the development of international criminal law over the
past year, the most significant ones, in my view, included the Special Court for Sierra Leone's
appellate confirmation of the Charles Taylor verdict, as well as the United Nations Security
Council's failure to refer the Syrian situation to the International Criminal Court (ICC).
THE CHARLES TAYLOR VERDICT

On September 26, 2013, the Special Court for Sierra Leone's (SCSL) Appellate Chamber
upheld the same tribunal's Trial Chamber's judgment and sentence of Charles Taylor to 50
years of imprisonment for aiding and abetting murders, rapes, and other acts of violence
during the Sierra Leonean civil war. 1 Charles Taylor served as President of Liberia during
the 1990s, and in this capacity he actively supported Sierra Leonean rebel groups, responsible
for some of the worst atrocities committed against this country's civilian population.2
The Appellate Chamber's confirmation of the verdict against Taylor was tremendously
significant in international criminal law. First, the guilty verdict coupled with the lengthy
sentence (Charles Taylor is 65 years old, so the 50-year sentence effectively amounts to life
imprisonment) represents an enormous achievement of international criminal law. Taylor is
the first former head of state to be criminally prosecuted and sentenced since Nuremberg,
and his prosecution and eventual judgment send a strong message of deterrence to other
heads of state. Additionally, the Taylor judgment stands for the proposition that impunity
will not be tolerated in international criminal law, and that traditional notions of sovereignty
will not stand in the way of an international criminal prosecution.
Second, the Taylor case underscores the importance of secondary liability in international
criminal law. Taylor, like many other defendants in the Yugoslavia and Rwanda tribunals,
• Mr. Kaul, Ms. Stromseth, and Mr. Tladi did not contribute remarks to The Proceedings.
Charles R. Emrick Jr.-Calfee Halter & Griswold Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law. I would
like to thank ASIL for the opportunity to present these remarks at the 2014 Annual Meeting, as well as to commend
my prestigious co-panelists (International Criminal Court Judge Kaul, Professor Jane Stromseth, and Professor Dire
Vladi) for their insightful remarks, which have influenced the writing of these remarks.
1
Special Court for Sierra Leone, Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor, Case No. SCSL 03
01-A, Sept. 26, 2013, at http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=t 14fjFP4jJ8=&tabid= 191.
2
Marina Aksenova, The Taylor Appeal Judgment: Achievement of Fragmentation of International Criminal Law,
Oct. 20, 2013, at http://www.e-ir.info/2013/10/20/the-taylor-appeal-judgment-an-achievement-or-another-step-in
the-fragmentation-of-intemational-criminal-law/.
t
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was prosecuted on the theory of accomplice liability-for having aided and abetted in the
accomplishment of heinous crimes during the Sierra Leonean civil war. 3 Since Taylor had
no personal involvement or participation in the war, imposing secondary or accomplice
liability on him was the only manner in which prosecution could proceed. The Appellate
Chamber noted that ''individual criminal responsibility for aiding and abetting the planning,
preparation or execution of a crime, as expressly provided for in Article 6( 1), is unquestionably
well-established and fundamental in customary international law." 4 The Appellate Chamber
thus confirmed that accomplice liability is a well-accepted mode of criminal liability in
international criminal law, both under the SCSL Statute and in international custom. Moreover,
the Appellate Chamber rejected the recent "trend" espoused by the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY or Yugoslavia Tribunal), which demands that
the aid and assistance must be geared towards the specific offense-the so-called ''specific
direction" requirement. 5 In fact, also in 2013, the Yugoslavia Tribunal acquitted two defen
dants, Perisic and Stanisic, holding that the assistance which these defendants had provided
was not specifically directed towards the commission of specific crimes, but was merely
geared to the general war effort. 6 This vision of complicity embraced by the Yugoslavia
Tribunal narrowed down the scope of accomplice liability; the Taylor case rejected this
approach and chose not to follow the Yugoslavia Tribunal's case law. While this seeming
disagreement between the judges of the Yugoslavia Tribunal and the SCSL may have the
negative consequence of preventing the development of a uniform norm of customary law
on the issue of accomplice liability, the positive effects of the Taylor judgment are that it
rejects any limitation on accomplice liability and that it may serve as an important precedent
in any future prosecutions of former heads of state.
Third, the Taylor judgment represents a significant development in the prosecution of
gender-based crimes. The Taylor verdict is the first time that a former head of state has been
convicted of various crimes of sexual violence. 7 Both the trial and the appellate judges
recognized that rape, sexual slavery, and other forms of sexual violence were used during
the Sierra Leonean conflict as a strategic weapon of warfare. In addition, these crimes ''were
widespread and systematic, committed as part of a strategic campaign to impact the conflict
by terrorising, demoralising, and destroying the affected civilian populations through sexual
violence." 8 Charles Taylor was convicted of aiding and abetting in the commission of such
crimes of sexual violence, by providing logistical, financial, technical, medical, and other
3

Id.
Prosecutor v. Taylor, supra note I, para. 383.
5 Aksenova, supra note 2. ICTY Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Perisic, Case No. IT-04-81-A, Feb. 28, 2013,
at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/perisic/acjug/en/130228.Judgement.pdf; ICTY Trial Chamber I, Prosecutor v. Stani
sic, Case No. IT-03-69-T, May 30, 2013, at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/stanisic_simatovidtjug/en/
130530.Judgement_pl.pdf.
6 Much has been written about the Perisic and Stanisic acquittals. See, e.g., Kevin Jon Heller, Why the ICTY's
"Specifically Directed" Requirement Is Justified, June 2, 2013, at http://opiniojuris.org/2013/06/02/why-the-ictys
specifically-directed-requirement-is-justified/ (approving of the ICTY's "specific direction" requirement); but see
Marko Milanovic, The Limits of Aiding and Abetting liability: The /CTY Appeals Chamber Acquits Momcilo
Perisic, Mar. 11, 2013, at http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-limits-of-aiding-and-abetting-liability-the-icty-appeals-cham
ber-acquits-momcilo-perisic/ (criticizing the ICTY's acquittal of Perisic). See also James G. Stewart, The ICTY
Loses its Way on Complicity-Part J, Apr. 3, 2013, at http://opiniojuris.org/2013/04/03/guest-post-the-icty-loses
its-way-on-complicity-part-l/.
7 Kelly Askin, Charles Taylor Judgment Is a Victory for Gender Justice, GUARDIAN, Apr. 27, 2012, available
at http://www.theguardian.com/law/2012/apr/27/charles-taylor-judgment-victory-gender-justice.
8
Id.
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forms of support to the rebel groups. 9 While other international tribunals had already convicted
defendants of such crimes, all such prosecutions involved defendants who had personally
participated in the commission thereof. The Taylor case represents the first instance of
accomplice liability imposed on a political leader, who while far removed from the battlefield,
aided and abetted in the commission of sex crimes by providing encouragement and support
and by not punishing the offenders. For victims of sexual violence, this development in
international criminal law has long been overdue. 10
Fourth, the Taylor judgment has contributed tremendously to the development of interna
tional gender jurisprudence. 11 The Taylor case solidified the legal definition of sexual slav
ery.12 In addition, the SCSL judges proposed to replace the term "forced marriage" with
"conjugal slavery," recognizing that many female victims of the Sierra Leonean war were
not officially "married" to their abductors, but were instead enslaved for the dual purpose
of being repeatedly subjected to rape and being forced to engage in domestic labor. 13 This
new term may better capture the nature of the heinous international crime which various
rebel groups had been committing in Sierra Leone, and which Taylor aided and abetted. 14
Finally, the Taylor trial judgment firmly established that an individual may be prosecuted
for crimes against humanity of rape and sexual slavery, as well as for the war crimes of
committing acts of terror and sexual violence. Thus, the Taylor case solidified the growing
consensus that gender-based crimes can constitute both crimes against humanity (if committed
on a systematic basis) and war crimes. 15
In sum, the Taylor appellate verdict confirmed all of the relevant achievements of the
trial chamber, which had, in its judgment, contributed to the development of both accomplice
liability under international criminal law, as well as of the proposition that gender-based/
sexual violence crimes can be prosecuted both as crimes against humanity and as war crimes.
THE ICC AND POLITICS: FAILURE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO
REFER THE SYRIAN CASE TO THE ICC

The second most significant development in international criminal law is the UN Security
Council's failure to refer the Syrian situation to the ICC. This ''development'' is less fortunate
than the previously discussed Taylor verdict, but it remains significant because it underscores
the specific role which the ICC currently plays in international criminal justice as a court
of law heavily influenced by international politics of the Great Powers. 16

9 Jd.

10
Id. ("The Taylor verdict represents a welcome and long overdue recognition that civilian or military leaders
who are far from the battlefield but who support and encourage sexual violence, or make no attempt to prevent or
punish it, can be held responsible for sex crimes.").
11
Valerie Oosterveld, Gender and the Charles Taylor Case at the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 19 WM. &
MARY J. WOMEN & L. 7 (2012).
12
Id. at 9.
13

/d.

14 ld.
15

Id. (arguing that "the Taylor trial judgment was a step forward in international gender jurisprudence.").
The term "Great Powers" as used in these remarks refers to the five permanent members of the Security
Council (the United States, Russia, China, France, and the United Kingdom). The term "Great Powers" has been
used in other contexts to describe the G-8 countries, as well as other politically, militarily, and financially powerful
nations. See, e.g., Milena Sterio, On the Right to External Self-Determination: "Selfistans," Secession and the
Great Powers' Rule, 19 MINN. J. lNT'L L. 137 (2010).
16
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In August 2013, reports surfaced that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad had used chemical
weapons against his own civilian population. 17 Syria has been plagued by an increasingly
violent civil conflict since the Arab Spring of 2011, and these allegations reinforced the
increasing sentiment that the international community ought to do something about the Syrian
situation. However, the Security Council remained deadlocked because of the threat of
Russian, and potentially Chinese, veto over any resolution that would authorize forceful
measures against the Syrian regime, including a potential resolution referring the situation
to the ICC. 18 The United States, while not directly threatening to veto a referral resolution,
has so far not supported a referral to the ICC and has preferred exploring the possibility of
establishing a Syrian ad hoc tribunal. 19
Because of the ICC's jurisdictional structure, the Syrian situation may never be examined
by this tribunal as Syria is not a state party to the court, and as all potential crimes seem to
have been committed by Syrian nationals (nationals of a non-party). 20 Thus, the only way
that the ICC could examine potential humanitarian violations by the Syrian leadership would
be through a Security Council referral. 21 The absence of the referral, because of the inherent
veto structure of the Security Council, can be interpreted as having undermined the legitimacy
of the tribunal, which appears powerless in the wake of Syrian violence. This in tum may
be feeding a sense of impunity on behalf of the Syrian leadership. In fact, the latest report
of the United Nations Commission of Inquiry on Syria stated plainly that "[t]he warring
parties do not fear being held accountable for their acts." 22 Most agree that ICC involvement
in the crisis would send a stronger message of deterrence to the Assad leadership, by signaling
that flouting international law leads to serious consequences and potential accountability
before the world's only permanent international criminal tribunal.
Moreover, an ICC indictment of Syrian leaders could contribute to peace negotiations in
Syria. Past practice from other conflicts and situations indicates that indictments of senior
political and military leaders before international tribunals can actually contribute to strength
ening peace efforts ''by delegitimizing and marginalizing those who stand in the way of
17
Syria Chemical Attack: What We Know, BBC NEWS, Sept. 24, 2013, available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/
world-middle-east-23927399; see also United Nations Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical
Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, Report on the Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons in the Ghouta Area of
Damascus on 21 August 2013, Sept. 13, 2013, available at http://www.un.org/disarmament/content/slideshow/
Secretary_General_Report_of_CW_Investigation.pdf.
18
Louis Charbonneau & Michelle Nichols, U.N. Security Council Powers Meet Again on Syria; No Outcome,
REUTERS, Aug. 29, 2013, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/29/us-syria-crisis-un-idUS
BRE97Sl 7R20130829 (noting that Russia and China had vetoed three proposed resolutions that would have
condemned the Assad regime and threatened United Nations sanctions).
19
Balkees Jarrah, The United States Should Support ICC Involvement in Syria, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Mar.
19, 2004, at http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/03/19/united-states-should-support-icc-involvement-syria.
20
Article 12 of the ICC Statute specifies that the court may exercise jurisdiction if one of the following States
is a party to the Statute: "The State on the territory of which the conduct in question occurred ...." or "The
State of which the person accused of the crime is a national." Article 12 would thus preclude the exercise of
jurisdiction by the ICC in a situation like Syria, where an alleged crime occurred on the territory of a non-state
party, when such alleged crimes are committed by nationals of a non-state party. Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court art. 12, at http://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/ea9aeff7-5752-4f84-be94-0a655eb30el6/0/
rome_statute_english.pdf [hereinafter ICC Statute].
21
Article 13(b) of the ICC Statute specifies that the court may exercise jurisdiction if "A situation in which one
or more of such crimes appears to have been committed is referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting
under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.'' ICC Statute, id., art. l 3(b). The exercise of such jurisdiction
by the ICC through a Security Council referral is not limited by the territoriality or nationality basis of jurisdiction
specified in Article 12. See id. art. 12.
22
United Nations, Human Rights Council, 25th Sess., Report of the Independent International Commission of
Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, Feb. 12, 2014, A/HRC/25/65, at I.
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resolving the conflict. " 23 Some successful examples include the indictments of Radovan
Karadzic, the Bosnian Serbs' political leader, and Ratko Mladic, their military commander,
by the ICTY, which have been credited with preventing them from attending the Dayton
peace talks, which led to the end of the Bosnian war. 24 Similarly, the unsealing of the arrest
warrant against former Liberian President Charles Taylor at the start of negotiations to end
the Liberian civil war was generally viewed as helpful in moving these negotiations forward. 25
Many have argued, in the Syrian context, that ICC involvement should not represent the
only step that the international community would undertake toward resolving the ongoing
crisis, but that instead, the ICC could play a key role in developing a comprehensive peace
plan and strategy in Syria, by forcing indicted Syrian leaders to remain outside any negotiations
and by thus allowing others to take on leadership roles in Syria. 26
It should be noted that the ICC has played an important role in other conflicts. In 2009,
the ICC pre-trial chamber issued an arrest warrant against the Sudanese president Omar Al
Bashir, who was indicted on various charges of crimes against humanity and war crimes;
the ICC investigation into Sudan was made possible through a Security Council referral in
2005. 27 In that case, Russia voted in favor of the resolution, while the United States and
China abstained. 28 The ICC has also been actively investigating the Libyan situation, referred
to the court in a unanimously passed 2011 Security Council resolution. 29 While ICC involve
ment in countries like Sudan and Libya could contribute to peace processes and conflict
resolution, the ICC's jurisdiction unfortunately remains limited and tied to the politics of
the Great Powers, such as the United States, Russia, and China. In cases where an ICC
referral has coincided with the Great Powers' strategic interests, these countries have voted
in favor of a Security Council resolution referring a situation to the court (as in the cases
of Sudan and Libya). 30 The Syrian situation, on the contrary, seems to have split the Great
Powers along their geo-political interests, resulting in a veto threat by Russia and China,
and in U.S. unwillingness to strongly support a referral (perhaps due to the United States'
general opposition to the ICC). According to Richard Dicker, International Justice Director
at Human Rights Watch, "When it comes to ICC referrals, the United States, Russia, and
China seem more concerned about prosecuting their enemies and protecting their friends.
This checkered approach has left victims of abuses in Syria, Gaza, and Sri Lanka without
recourse to justice." 31 In addition, according to Dicker, "The Security Council's 'on again,
23

See Jarrah, supra note 19.
ld.
25 ld.
26 /d.
24

27
For a detailed description of the Bashir case, see American Non-Governmental Organizations Coalition for
the International Criminal Court, Investigations & Cases, Darfur, Sudan, Al Bashir, at http://www.amicc.org/icc/
albashir [hereinafter AMICC]; see Security Council Resolution 1593, Mar. 31, 2005, S/RES/1593 (2005), at http://
www .icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/85FEBD 1A-29F8-4EC4-9566-48EDF55CC587/283244/N0529273.pdf (referring the
Darfur situation to the ICC).
28
AMICC, at http://www.amicc.org/icc/referrals.
29
Security Council Resolution 1970, Feb. 26, 2011, S/RES/1970 (2011), at http://www.onpcsb.ro/pdf/UN
SC%20Resolution%201970.pdf.
30
It should be noted that even these Security Council referrals were limited. "Both referrals imposed the entire
financial burden of the new investigations and prosecutions on the court and its member countries. They also
allowed exemptions for the nationals of non-member third countries should they be implicated in serious crimes
committed in the referred country." See UN Security Council: Address Inconsistency in ICC Referrals, HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, Oct. 16, 2012, at http://www.hrw.org/news/2012110/16/un-security-council-address-inconsistency
icc-referrals-O. In addition, the Security Council has not actively supported the ICC in its investigations in Darfur
and in Libya. Id.
31 /d.
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off again' approach to ICC referrals undermines its credibility in promoting justice. " 32 The
ICC thus remains an important organ of international criminal justice whose role in world
affairs has been limited by the politics of the Great Powers.
CONCLUSION

Many events in 2013 have contributed to the development of international criminal law;
the ones which most profoundly impacted this field included the Charles Taylor appellate
verdict and the Security Council's failure to refer the Syrian case to the ICC. The former is
significant because it represents the first time since Nuremberg that a former head of state
has been convicted by an international tribunal; the latter is important because it illustrates
the ICC's peculiar role in international justice, as a court of law limited by international
politics.
32

Id.
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